The classic structure-conduct-performance approach to industrial organization centers on three questions. First, why does an industry look the way it does, in terms of numbers of competitors, market share distribution, and various other metrics? Second, how do firms actually compete, in terms of the formation of prices, quality of products and services, rivalry and collaboration within and across strategic groups, and other attributes of economic behavior? And third, how does the industry perform for its shareholders, employees, clients, and suppliers, and how does it perform within the context of the system as a whole, in terms of its impact on income and growth, stability, and possibly less clearly defined ideas about such issues as social equity? In the financial services industry, these same questions have attracted more than the normal degree of attention. The industry is "special" in a variety of ways, including the fiduciary nature of the business, its role at the center of the payments and capital allocation process with all the static and dynamic implications for economic performance, and the systemic nature of problems that can arise in the industry. So the structure, conduct, and performance of the financial services industry have unusually important public interest dimensions.
Figure 1. Multifunctional Financial Linkages
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Investment banking firms. What should they be trying to do, and how does this relate to the issues of size and breadth? It then reviews the available evidence and reaches a set of tentative conclusions from what we know so far, both from the perspective of a shareholder and from that of the financial system as a whole.
A Simple Strategic Schematic
Financial firms want to allocate available financial, human, and technological resources to market segments that promise to throw off the highest risk-adjusted returns.
1 In order to do this, they have to appropriately attribute costs, returns, and risks to specific cells in a clientproduct-geography matrix. And the cells themselves have to be linked together in a way that maximizes what practitioners and analysts commonly call "synergies":
-Client-driven linkages exist when a financial institution serving a particular client or group of clients can, as a result, supply financial services either to the same client or to another client in the same group more efficiently in the same or different geographies. Risk mitigation results from spreading exposures across clients, and achieving more stable earnings, to the extent that income streams from different clients or segments of clients are not perfectly correlated.
-Product-driven linkages exist when an institution can supply a particular financial service in a more competitive manner because it is already producing the same or a similar financial service in different client or arena dimensions. Here again, there is risk mitigation to the extent that net revenue streams from different products are not perfectly correlated.
-Geographic linkages are important when an institution can serve a particular client or supply a particular service more efficiently in one geography as a result of having an active presence in another geography. Once more, the risk profile of the firm may be improved to the extent that business is spread across different currency, macroeconomic, and interest rate environments.
To extract maximum returns from the market matrix, firms need to understand the competitive dynamics of specific segments as well as the costs-including acquisition and integration costs in the case of merger and acquisition (M&A) initiatives-and the risks embedded in the overall portfolio of activities. Especially challenging is the task of optimizing the linkages between the segments to maximize potential joint cost and revenue economies. Firms that do this well can be considered to have a high degree of "strategic integrity" and should have a market capitalization that exceeds the stand-alone value of their constituent businesses.
So are bigger and broader better in the financial services industry? If so, why? And what is the evidence? Here we shall consider each of the major arguments, pro and con.
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
Whether economies or diseconomies of scale exist in financial services has been at the heart of strategic and regulatory discussions about optimum firm size in the financial services industry. Are larger firms associated with increased scale economies and hence profitability and shareholder value? Can increased average size of firms create a more efficient financial sector? Answers are not easy to find, because they have to isolate the impact of pure size of the production unit as a whole from all of the other impacts of size on revenues and costs.
In an information-and transactions-intensive industry with frequently high fixed costs, such as financial services, there should be ample potential for scale economies. However, the potential for diseconomies of scale attributable to disproportionate increases in administrative overhead, management of complexity, agency problems, and other cost factors could also occur in very large financial services firms. If economies of scale prevail, increased size will help to create financial efficiency and shareholder value. If diseconomies prevail, both will be destroyed. Scale effects should be directly observable in the cost functions of financial services firms and in aggregate measures of performance.
Many studies of economies of scale have been undertaken in the banking, insurance, and securities industries over the years.
2 Unfortunately, examinations of both scale and scope economies in financial services are unusually problematic. The nature of the empirical tests used, the form of the cost functions, the existence of unique levels of optimum output, and the optimizing behavior of financial firms all present difficulties. Limited availability and conformity of data present serious empirical issues. And the conclusions of any study that has detected (or failed to detect) economies of scale or scope in a sample of financial institutions do not necessarily have general applicability. Nevertheless, the impact on the operating economics (production functions) of financial firms is so important that the available empirical evidence is central to the whole argument.
Estimated cost functions form the basis of most of the available empirical tests. Virtually all of them have found that economies of scale are achieved with increases in size among small commercial banks (below $100 million in assets). A few studies have shown that scale economies may also exist in banks falling into the $100 million to $5 billion range. There is very little evidence so far of scale economies in the case of banks larger than $5 billion. More recently, there is some scattered evidence of scale-related cost gains for banks up to $25 billion in assets.
3 But according to a survey of all empirical studies of economies of scale through 1998, there is no evidence of such economies among very large banks. Several studies have found the relationship between size and average cost to be U-shaped. 4 This suggests that small banks can benefit from economies of scale but that large banks seem to suffer from diseconomies of scale, resulting in higher average costs as they increase in size. The consensus seems to be that scale economies and diseconomies generally do not result in more than about a 5 percent difference in unit costs. Inability to find major economies of scale among large financial services firms is also true of insurance companies and broker-dealers. 5 Lang and Wetzel find diseconomies of scale in both banking and securities services among German universal banks.
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Except for the very smallest banks and nonbank financial firms, scale economies seem likely to have relatively little bearing on competitive performance. This is particularly true because smaller institutions sometimes are linked together in cooperatives or other structures that allow
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them to harvest available economies of scale centrally or are specialists in specific market segments that are not particularly sensitive to the relatively small cost differences that seem to be associated with economies of scale in the financial services industry. A basic problem is that most of the available empirical studies focus entirely on firm-wide scale economies when the most important issues of scale are encountered at the level of individual businesses. There is ample evidence, for example, that economies of scale are significant for operating economies and competitive performance in areas such as global custody, processing of mass-market credit card transactions, and institutional asset management. Economies of scale may be far less important in other areas such as private banking and M&A advisory services. Unfortunately, empirical data on cost functions that would permit identification of economies of scale at the product level are generally proprietary and therefore unavailable. Although disturbing, it seems reasonable that a scale-driven strategy may make a great deal of sense in specific areas of financial activity even in the absence of evidence that there is much to be gained at the firm-wide level. Still, the notion that some lines of activity clearly benefit from scale economies, while at the same time firm-wide economies of scale are empirically elusive, suggests that diseconomies of scale must exist in numerous lines of activity (or combinations of activities).
Cost Economies of Scope
Beyond pure scale effects, are there cost reductions to be achieved by selling a broader rather than a narrower range of products? On the one hand, cost economies of scope mean that jointly producing two or more products or services is accomplished more cheaply than producing them separately. "Global" scope economies become evident on the cost side when the total cost of producing all products is less than producing them individually, while "activity-specific" economies consider the joint production of particular pairs or clusters of financial services. Cost economies of scope can be harvested through the sharing of information technology platforms and other types of overhead, information and monitoring costs, and the like. Information, for example, can be reused and thereby avoid cost duplication, facilitate creativity in developing solu-tions to client problems, and leverage client-specific knowledge. 7 On the other hand, cost diseconomies of scope may arise from such factors as inertia and lack of responsiveness and creativity that may come with increased breadth, complexity, and bureaucratization of the firm, "turf" and profit-attribution conflicts that increase costs or erode product quality in meeting client needs, or serious cultural differences across the organizational "silos" that inhibit seamless delivery of a broad range of financial services.
Like economies of scale, cost-related scope economies should be directly observable in the cost functions of financial services suppliers and in aggregate measures of performance. Most empirical studies have failed to find significant cost economies of scope in the banking, insurance, or securities industries.
8 They suggest that some cost diseconomies of scope are encountered when firms in the financial services sector add new product ranges to their portfolios. Saunders and Walter, for example, find negative cost economies of scope among the world's 200 largest banks-as the product range widens, unit costs seem to go up, although not dramatically so. However, the period covered by many of these studies involves firms that were shifting away from a pure focus on banking or insurance and may thus have incurred considerable front-end costs in expanding the range of their activities. If these outlays were expensed in accounting statements during the period under study, then one might expect to see evidence of diseconomies of scope reversed in future periods. The evidence on the cost economies of scope so far remains inconclusive.
Operating Efficiencies
Besides economies of scale and cost economies of scope, financial firms of roughly the same size and providing roughly the same range of services can have very different cost levels per unit of output. There is ample evidence that such differences in performance exist, for example, in comparisons of cost-to-income ratios among banks, insurance compa-nies, and investment firms of comparable size. The reasons involve differences in production functions, reflecting efficiency and effectiveness in the use of labor and capital, sourcing and application of available technology, and acquisition of inputs, organizational design, compensation, and incentive systems-that is, in just plain better or worse management. These are what economists call X-efficiencies.
A number of studies have found rather large disparities in cost structures among banks of similar size, suggesting that the way banks are run is more important than their size or the selection of businesses that they pursue. 10 The consensus of studies conducted in the United States seems to be that average unit costs in the banking industry are some 20 percent above those of best-practice firms producing the same range and volume of services, with most of the difference attributable to operating economies rather than differences in the cost of funds. 11 Siems finds that the greater the overlap in branch networks, the higher the abnormal equity returns in U.S. bank mergers; no such abnormal returns are associated with other factors like regional concentration ratios, suggesting that gains in shareholder value in many of the U.S. banking mergers of the 1990s were associated more with increases in X-efficiency than with reductions in competition.
12 If true, this is good news for smaller firms, since the quality of management seems to be far more important in driving costs than raw size or scope. Of course, if very large institutions are systematically better managed than smaller ones (which may be difficult to document in the real world of financial services), then there may be a link between firm size and X-efficiency.
It is also possible that very large organizations may be more capable of the massive and "lumpy" capital outlays required to install and maintain the most efficient information technology and transactions processing infrastructures. 13 If extremely high recurring levels of technology spending result in greater X-efficiency, then large financial services firms will tend to benefit in competition with smaller ones. Smaller firms will then have to rely on pooling and outsourcing, if feasible.
In banking M&A studies, Berger and Humphrey find that acquiring banks tend to be significantly more efficient than acquired banks, sug-gesting that the acquirer may potentially improve the X-efficiency of the target.
14 Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey find that mega-mergers between U.S. banks increase returns by improving efficiency rather than increasing prices, suggesting also that acquiring banks use acquisitions as an occasion to improve efficiency within their own organization. 15 Houston and Ryngaert as well as DeLong find that the market rewards mergers where geographic overlap exists between acquirer and target, presumably due to expected gains in X-efficiency.
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Revenue Economies of Scope
On the revenue side, economies of scope attributable to cross-selling arise when the all-in cost to the buyer of purchasing multiple financial services from a single supplier is less than the cost of purchasing them from separate suppliers. This includes the cost of the services themselves plus information, search, monitoring, contracting, and other costs. And firms that are diversified into several types of activities or several geographic areas tend to have more contact points with clients. Revenue diseconomies of scope could arise from management complexities and conflicts associated with greater breadth.
Some evidence on revenue economies of scope comes from historical studies. Kroszner and Rajan find that U.S. bank affiliates typically underwrote better-performing securities than specialized investment banks during the 1920s, when U.S. commercial banks were permitted to have securities affiliates.
17 Perhaps commercial banks obtained knowledge about firms contemplating selling securities through the deposit and borrowing history of the firm. If so, they could then select the best risks to bring to market. Likewise, Puri finds that securities underwritten by commercial banks generated higher prices than similar securities underwritten by investment banks; this suggests lower ex ante risk for securities underwritten by commercial banks.
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Most empirical studies of cross-selling are based on survey data and are therefore difficult to generalize. The issue is whether companies are more likely to award M&A work to banks that are also willing lenders or whether the two services are separable-so that companies go to the firms with the perceived best M&A capabilities (probably investment banking houses) for advice and to others (presumably the major commercial banks) for loans. The responses suggest that companies view these services as a single value chain, so that banks that are willing to provide significant lending are also more likely to obtain M&A advisory work. Indeed, table 1 suggests that well over half of the major M&A firms (in terms of fees) in 2001 were commercial banks with substantial lending power. This is sometimes called "mixed bundling," meaning that the price of one service (for example, commercial lending) is dependent on the client also taking another service (for example, M&A advice or securities underwriting), although the search for immediate scope-driven revenue gains may have led to some disastrous lending by commercial banks in the energy and telecommunications sectors in recent years.
However, it is at the retail level that the bulk of the revenue economies of scope are likely to materialize, since the search costs and contracting costs are likely to be higher for retail customers than for corporate customers. There is limited U.S. evidence on retail cross-selling due to the regulatory restraints in place until 1999, and evidence from Europe, where universal banking and multifunctional financial conglomerates have always been part of the landscape, is mainly based on cases and suggests highly variable outcomes as to the efficacy of bancassurance or allfinanz.
In any case, the future may see some very different retail business models. One example is depicted in figure 2. Here clients take advantage of user-friendly home interfaces to access web service platforms, which allow real-time linkages to multiple vendors of financial services. For the client, it could combine the "feel" of single-source purchasing with access to best-in-class vendors-the client "cross-purchases" rather than being "cross-sold." Absent the need for continuous financial advice, such a business model could reduce information costs, transactions costs, and contracting costs, while at the same time providing client-driven openarchitecture access to the universe of competing vendors. Advice could be built into the model by suppliers who find a way to incorporate the advisory function into their downlinks or through independent financial advisers. If, in the future, such models of retail financial services delivery take hold in the market, then some of the rationale for cross-selling and revenue economies of scope could become obsolete.
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Despite an almost total lack of hard empirical evidence, revenue economies of scope may indeed exist at both the wholesale and retail level. But they are likely to be very specific to the types of services provided and the types of clients served. So revenue-related scope economies are clearly linked to a firm's specific strategic positioning across clients, products, and geographies. Even if the potential for cross-selling exists, the devil is in the details-mainly in the design of incentives and organizational structures to ensure that it actually occurs. And these incentives have to be extremely granular and compatible with the real-world behavior of employees. Without them, no amount of management pressure and exhortation to cross-sell is likely to achieve its objectives.
Network economies associated with multifunctional financial firms may be considered a special type of demand-side economy of scope.
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Like telecommunications, relationships with end users of financial services represent a network structure wherein additional client linkages add value to existing clients by increasing the feasibility or reducing the cost of accessing them. So-called network externalities tend to increase with the absolute size of the network itself. Every link of the client to the firm potentially "complements" every other one and potentially adds value through either one-way or two-way exchanges. The size of network benefits depends on technical compatibility and coordination in time and location, which universal banks and financial conglomerates may be in a position to provide. And networks tend to be self-reinforcing in that they require a minimum critical mass and tend to grow in dominance as they increase in size, thus precluding perfect competition in network-driven businesses. This characteristic may be evident in activities such as securities clearance and settlement, global custody, funds transfer, and international cash management and may serve to lock in clients insofar as switching costs tend to be relatively high.
What little empirical evidence there is suggests that revenue economies of scope seem to exist for specific combinations of products in the realm of commercial and investment banking as well as insurance and asset management. Empirical evidence concerning the existence of certain product-specific revenue economies of scope is beginning to materialize. For example, Yu shows that share prices of U.S. financial conglomerates as well as specialists responded favorably when the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 was announced. 20 The study finds that the market reacted most favorably for the shares of large securities firms, large insurance companies, and bank holding companies already engaged in some securities businesses (those with Section 20 subsidiaries allowing limited investment banking activities). The study suggests that the market expected gains from product diversification possibly arising from cross-product synergies. Another study-by Lown and others -similarly finds that both commercial and investment bank stocks rose when President Clinton announced on October 22, 1999, that passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was imminent.
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Market Power
In addition to the strategic search for operating economies and revenue synergies, financial services firms also seek to dominate markets in order to extract economic returns. This is often referred to as economies of "size" as opposed to classic economies of "scale" and can convey distinct competitive advantages that are reflected in either volume of business or margins or both.
Market power allows banks to charge more (monopoly benefits) or pay less (monopsony benefits). Indeed, many national markets for financial services have shown a distinct tendency toward oligopoly. Supporters argue that high levels of market concentration are necessary in order to provide a viable competitive platform. Without convincing evidence of scale economies or other size-related efficiency gains, opponents argue that monopolistic market structures serve mainly to extract rents from consumers or users of financial services and to redistribute them to shareholders, cross-subsidize other areas of activity, invest in wasteful projects, or reduce pressures for cost containment.
Indeed, it is a puzzle why managers of financial services firms often seem to believe that the endgame in their industry's competitive structure is the emergence of a few firms in gentlemanly competition with nice sustainable margins, whereas in the real world such an outcome can easily trigger public policy reaction leading to break-ups and spin-offs in order to restore more vigorous competition. Particularly in a critical economic sector that is easily politicized, such as financial services, a regulatory response to "excessive" concentration is a virtual certainty despite sometimes furious lobbying to the contrary. In the case of Canada, for example, regulators prevented two mega-mergers in late 1998 that would have reduced the number of major financial firms from five to three, with a retail market share of perhaps 90 percent between them. Regulators blocked the deals despite arguments by management that major U.S. financial services firms operating in Canada under the rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement would provide the necessary competitive pressure to prevent exploitation of monopoly power.
Financial services market structures differ substantially, as measured, for example, by the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. This metric of competitive structure is the sum of the squared market shares (H = Ss 2 ), where 0 < H < 10,000, and market shares are measured, for example, by deposits, by assets, or by other indicators of market share. H rises as the number of competitors declines and as market share concentration increases among a given number of competitors. Empirically, higher values of H tend to be associated with higher degrees of pricing power, price-cost margins, and returns on equity across a broad range of industries. For example, despite very substantial consolidation in recent years within perhaps the most concentrated segment of the financial services industry-wholesale banking and capital markets activities-there is little evidence of market power. With some 80 percent of the combined value of global fixedincome and equity underwriting, loan syndications, and M&A mandates captured by the top-ten firms, the Herfindahl-Hirshman index was still only 745 in 2001. This suggests a ruthlessly competitive market structure in most of these businesses, which is reflected in the returns to investors who own shares in the principal players in the industry-in fact, there has been a long-term erosion of return on capital invested in the wholesale banking industry.
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Another example is asset management, where the top firms comprise a mixture of European, American, and Japanese asset managers and at the same time a mixture of banks, broker-dealers, independent fund management companies, and insurance companies. Although market definitions clearly have to be drawn more precisely, at least on a global level asset management seems to be among the most contestable in the entire financial services industry, with a Herfindahl-Hirshman index of 540 among the top-forty firms in terms of assets under management. And it shows very few signs of increasing concentration in recent years.
In short, although monopoly power created through mergers and acquisitions in the financial services industry can produce market conditions that allow firms to reallocate gains from clients to themselves, such conditions are difficult to achieve or to sustain. Sometimes new players-even relatively small entrants-penetrate the market and destroy oligopolistic pricing structures. Or good substitutes are available from other types of financial services firms, and consumers are willing to shop around. Vigorous competition (and low Herfindahl-Hirshman indexes) seems to be maintained even after intensive M&A activity, in most cases as a consequence of relatively even distributions of market shares among the leading firms in many financial services businesses.
Berger and Hannan find that loan rates were higher and deposit rates were lower when banks operated in concentrated markets.
23 These higher revenues, however, did not result in higher profits-instead, the study shows evidence consistent with higher cost structures in banks in these markets than in their counterparts in less concentrated markets. Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey find that banks that merge charge more for loans and pay less on deposits before they merge than other large banks-banks that merged charged 17 basis points more for loans than the average large bank prior to merging. 24 After the merger, however, this difference fell to about 10 basis points. This suggests that merging banks do not tend to take advantage of their increased market power. The authors contend that antitrust policy is effective in preventing mergers that would create market power problems. Siems reaches a similar conclusion. In a study of nineteen bank mega-mergers (partners valued over $500 million) in 1995, he rejects the market power hypothesis, although he finds that in-market mergers create positive value for both the acquirer and the target on announcement.
25 There is no relationship between the resulting abnormal returns and the change in the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. Still, concentration seems to affect prices. Beatty, Santomero, and Smirlock find that the higher the market concentration of the banking industry in a given region, the higher the premium paid to acquire a bank in that area.
26
Proprietary Information and Embedded Human Capital
One argument in favor of a large, diverse financial services industry is that internal information flows are substantially better and involve lower costs than external information flows that are accessible by more narrowly focused firms. Consequently, a firm that is present in a broad range of financial markets, functions, and geographies can find proprietary and client-driven trading and structuring opportunities that smaller and more narrow firms cannot.
A second argument has to do with technical know-how. Significant areas of financial services-particularly wholesale banking and asset management-have become the realm of highly specialized expertise that can be reflected in both market share and price effects. In recent years, large numbers of financial boutiques have been acquired by major banks, insurance companies, securities firms, and asset managers for precisely this purpose, and anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases these acquisitions have enhanced shareholder value for the buyer.
Closely aligned is the human capital argument. Technical skills and entrepreneurial behavior are embodied in people, and people can and do move. Parts of the financial services industry have become notorious for the mobility of talent to the point of "free agency," and people or teams of people sometimes regard themselves as "firms within firms." There are no empirical studies of these issues, although there is no question about their importance. Many financial services represent specialist businesses that are conducted by specialists meeting the requirements of specialist clients. Know-how embodied in people is clearly mobile, and the key is to provide a platform that is sufficiently incentive compatible to make the most of it. It seems unclear whether size or breadth has much to do with this.
Diversification of Business Streams, Credit Quality, and Financial Stability
Greater diversification of earnings attributable to multiple products, client groups, and geographies is often deemed to create more stable, safer, and ultimately more valuable financial institutions. The lower the correlations among the cash flows from the firm's various activities, the greater the benefits of diversification. The consequences should include higher credit quality and higher debt ratings (lower bankruptcy risk) and therefore lower costs of financing than those faced by narrower, more focused firms, while greater earnings stability should bolster stock prices. In combination, these effects should reduce the cost of capital and enhance profitability.
It has also been argued that shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates embody substantial franchise value due to their nature as conglomerates and importance in national economies. Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan suggest that this guaranteed franchise value serves to inhibit extraordinary risk-taking. 27 They find substantial evidence that the higher a bank's franchise value, the more prudent management tends to be. Such firms should therefore serve shareholder interests, as well as stability of the financial system-and the concerns of regulators-with a strong focus on risk management as opposed to financial firms with little to lose. This conclusion is, however, at variance with the observed, massive losses incurred recently by financial conglomerates and universal banks exposed to highly leveraged firms and special-purpose entities, real estate lending, and emerging market transactions.
Studies that test risk reduction often look at how hypothetical combi-nations could have reduced risk using actual industry data. In an early study, Santomero and Chung find that bank holding companies that existed from 1985 to 1989 could have reduced their probability of failure had they been permitted to diversify into insurance and securities. 28 Of the ten combinations the authors examined, the best combination is the bank holding company linking to both insurance and securities firms. The only combination that would have increased the probability of bankruptcy over a stand-alone bank holding company is one encompassing a large securities firm. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt test whether hypothetical mergers between bank holding companies and nonbanking financial firms decrease risk. 29 In their sample of data from 1971 to 1987, they find that mergers between bank holding companies and insurance firms could have reduced risk, while mergers between bank holding companies and securities firms or real estate firms could have increased risk. Saunders and Walter carry out a series of simulated mergers between U.S. banks, securities firms, and insurance companies in order to test the stability of earnings of the pro forma "merged" firm as opposed to separate institutions. 30 The opportunity set of potential mergers between existing firms and the risk characteristics of each possible combination are examined. The findings suggest that there are indeed potential risk reduction gains from diversification in multiple-activity financial services organizations and that these increase with the number of activities undertaken. The main risk reduction gains appear to arise from combining commercial banking with insurance activities rather than with securities activities.
Too-Big-to-Fail Guarantees
Given the unacceptable systemic consequences of institutional collapse, large financial services firms that surpass a given threshold will be bailed out by taxpayers. In the United States, this policy became explicit in 1984 when the Comptroller of the Currency testified to Congress that eleven banks were so important that they would not be permitted to fail.
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It was clearly present in the savings and loan collapses around that time.
In other countries, the same policy tends to exist and seems to cover even more of the local financial system. 32 There were numerous examples in Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland during the 1990s. Implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantees create a potentially important public subsidy for major financial firms.
TBTF support was arguably extended to nonbank financial firms in the rescue of Long-term Capital Management in 1998, brokered by the U.S. Federal Reserve (despite the fact that a credible private restructuring offer was on the table) on the basis that the firm's failure could cause systemic damage to the global financial system. J. P. Morgan made the same argument in 1996 about the global copper market and one of its then-dominant traders, Sumitomo. Morgan suggested that collapse of the copper market could have serious systemic effects. The speed with which the central banks and regulatory authorities reacted to that crisis signaled the possibility of safety net support of the copper market in light of major banks' massive exposures in highly complex structured credits to the industry. And there were even mutterings of systemic effects in the collapse of Enron in 2001. Most of the time, such arguments are self-serving nonsense, but in a political environment under crisis conditions, they could help to throw a safety net sufficiently broad to limit damage to the shareholders of exposed banks or other financial firms.
It is generally accepted that the larger the bank, the more likely it is to be covered under TBTF support. O'Hara and Shaw detail the benefits of TBTF status: Without state assurances, uninsured depositors and other liability holders demand a risk premium.
33 When a bank is not permitted to fail, the risk premium is no longer necessary. Furthermore, banks covered under the policy have an incentive to increase their risk in order to enjoy higher equity returns. Kane investigates the possibility that large banks enjoy access to the TBTF guarantees in a study of merger effects, although he does not distinguish between the stock market reaction to increased TBTF guarantees or the likelihood of increased profitability. 34 He suggests further study to determine whether acquiring banks increase their leverage, uninsured liabilities, nonperforming loans, and other risk exposures, all of which would suggest that they are taking advantage of TBTF guarantees.
One problem with the TBTF argument is to determine precisely when a financial institution becomes too big to fail. Citicorp was already the largest bank holding company in the United States before it merged with Travelers in 1998. Therefore, the TBTF argument may be a matter of degree. That is, the benefits of becoming larger may be marginal if a firm already enjoys TBTF status.
Conflicts of Interest
The potential for conflicts of interest is endemic in all multifunctional financial services firms. 35 Classic conflict of interest arguments include the following: -When firms have the power to sell affiliates' products, managers may no longer dispense "dispassionate" advice to clients and may have a salesman's stake in pushing "house" products, possibly to the disadvantage of the customer.
-A financial firm that is acting as an underwriter and is unable to place the securities in a public offering may seek to limit losses by "stuffing" unwanted securities into accounts over which it has discretionary authority.
-A bank with a loan outstanding to a client whose bankruptcy risk has increased, to the private knowledge of the banker, may have an incentive to encourage the borrower to issue bonds or equities to the general public, with the proceeds used to pay down the bank loan.
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-In order to ensure that an underwriting goes well, a bank may make below-market loans to third-party investors on condition that the proceeds are used to purchase securities underwritten by its securities unit.
-A bank may use its lending power activities to encourage a client to use its securities or securities services.
-By acting as a lender, a bank may become privy to certain material inside information about a customer or its rivals that can be used in set-35. Saunders and Walter (1994) . 36. One example is the 1995 underwriting of a secondary equity issue of the Hafnia Insurance Group by Den Danske Bank. The stock was distributed heavily to retail investors, with proceeds allegedly used to pay down bank loans even as Hafnia slid into bankruptcy (Smith and Walter 1997) . The case came before the Danish courts in a successful individual investor litigation supported by the government. ting prices, advising acquirers in a contested acquisition, or helping in the distribution of securities offerings underwritten by its securities unit.
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More generally, a financial firm may use proprietary information regarding a client for internal management purposes that, at the same time, harms the interests of the client.
The potential for conflicts of interest covers various degrees and intensities. Some are serious and basically intractable. Others can be managed by appropriate changes in incentives or compliance initiatives. And some are not sufficiently serious to worry about. But using a matrix approach to mapping conflicts of interest demonstrates that the broader the range of clients and products, the more numerous are the potential conflicts of interest and the more difficult is the task of keeping them under controland avoiding possibly large franchise losses.
Shareholders of financial firms have a vital stake in the management and control of conflicts of interest. They can benefit from the exploitation of conflicts in the short term, to the extent that business volumes or margins are higher as a result. On the one hand, preventing conflicts of interest is an expensive business-compliance systems are costly to maintain, and various types of walls between business units can have high opportunity costs because they give rise to inefficient use of information within the organization. On the other hand, costs associated with civil or criminal action and reputation losses due to conflicts of interest can weigh on shareholders very heavily indeed, as demonstrated by a variety of such problems in the financial services industry during 2000-02. Some have argued that conflicts of interest may contribute to the price to book value ratios of the shares of financial conglomerates and universal banks falling below those of more specialized financial services businesses.
Conflicts of interest can also impede market performance. For example, inside information accessible to a bank as lender to a target firm would almost certainly prevent that bank from acting as an M&A adviser to a potential acquirer. Entrepreneurs may not want their private banking affairs handled by a bank that also controls their business financing. A mutual fund investor is unlikely to have easy access to the full menu of available equity funds through a financial conglomerate offering competing in-house products. These issues may be manageable if most of the competition is coming from other financial conglomerates. But if the playing field is also populated by aggressive insurance companies, independent broker-dealers, fund managers, and other specialists, these issues tend to be a continuing strategic challenge for management (and a source of comfort for clients).
Should a major conflict of interest arise, the repercussions for a firm's reputation can be quite detrimental.
38 Recent well-reported examples include equity analyst conflicts of interest in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Analysts working for multifunctional financial firms wear several hats and are subject to multiple conflicts of interest. They are supposed to provide unbiased research to investors. But they are also expected to take part in the securities origination and sales process centered in their firms' corporate finance departments. The firms argue that expensive research functions cannot be paid for by attracting investor deals and brokerage commissions, so that corporate finance has to cover much of the cost. This fact, and the astronomical compensation packages commanded by top analysts (occasionally exceeding $20 million a year), is the best demonstration of which of the two hats dominates. Prosecution of investment banks by the attorney general of the state of New York in 2002, a $1.4 billion settlement, and a frantic scramble by all securities firms to reorganize how equity research is organized and compensated simply validated facts long known to market participants.
More broadly, both Citigroup and J. P. Morgan Chase in 2001 and 2002 were touched by just about every U.S. corporate scandal that was revealed, often involving conflicts of interest, and both lost well over a third of their equity value in a matter of months, no doubt in part as a consequence of conflicts of interest.
Conglomerate Discount
It is often argued that the shares of multiproduct firms and business conglomerates tend to trade at prices lower than shares of more narrowly focused firms (all else being equal). There are two basic reasons why this "conglomerate discount" is alleged to exist.
First, it is argued that, on the whole, conglomerates tend to use capital inefficiently. Thus the potential benefits of diversification must be weighed against the potential costs, which include greater management discretion to engage in value-reducing projects, cross-subsidization of marginal or loss-making projects that drain resources from healthy businesses, misalignments in incentives between central and divisional managers, and the like. For a sample of U.S. corporations during the period 1986-91, Berger and Ofek demonstrate an average value loss in multiproduct firms on the order of 13-15 percent, as compared to the standalone values of the constituent businesses.
39 They attribute the erosion of value in conglomerates largely to over-investment in marginally profitable activities and cross-subsidization. This loss of value was smaller in cases where the multiproduct firms were involved in closely allied activities within the same industrial sector. In other empirical work, John and Ofek show that the sale of assets by corporations results in significantly improved shareholder returns on the remaining capital employed, both as a result of greater focus in the enterprise and gains in value through high prices paid by the buyers of assets. 40 The evidence suggests that the internal capital market within conglomerates functions less efficiently than the external capital market.
Such empirical findings across broad ranges of industry may well apply to diverse activities carried out by financial firms as well. If retail banking, wholesale banking, and property and casualty (P&C) insurance are evolving into highly specialized, performance-driven businesses, for example, one may ask whether the kinds of conglomerate discounts found in industrial firms may not also apply to financial conglomeratesespecially if centralized decisionmaking is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the requirements of the specific businesses.
A second possible source of conglomerate discount is that investors in shares of conglomerates find it difficult to "take a view" and add purely sectoral exposures to their portfolios. Investors may want to avoid such stocks in their efforts to construct efficient asset allocation profiles. This is especially true of performance-driven managers of institutional equity portfolios who are under pressure to outperform their cohorts or equity indexes. Why would a fund manager want to invest in yet another (closed-end) fund in the form of a conglomerate-one that may be active in retail banking, wholesale commercial banking, middle-market lending, private banking, corporate finance, trading, investment banking, asset management insurance, and perhaps other businesses as well?
Both the capital misallocation effect and the portfolio selection effect may weaken investor demand for shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates, lower their equity prices, and produce a higher cost of capital than if the conglomerate discount were absent. This higher cost of capital would have a bearing on the competitive performance and profitability of the enterprise. It may wholly or partially offset some of the benefits of conglomeration, such as greater stability and lower bankruptcy risk, through diversification across business lines.
From Book Value of Equity to Market Value of Equity
From a shareholder perspective, all of the pluses and minuses of size and breadth among financial services firms can be captured in a simple valuation formula:
NPV f denotes the risk-adjusted discounted present value of a firm's aftertax earnings, E(R t ) represents the expected future revenues of the firm, E(C t ) represents expected future operating costs including charges to earnings for restructurings, loss provisions, and taxes. The net expected returns in the numerator are then discounted to the present using a riskfree rate i t and a composite risk adjustment a t -which captures the variance of expected net future returns resulting from credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and reputational risk and at the same time captures the correlations between such risks associated with the firm's various activities.
Strategic initiatives in financial firms increase shareholder value if they generate: (1) top-line gains that show up as increases in E(R t ) due, for example, to market extension, increased market share, wider profit
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margins, or successful cross-selling; (2) bottom-line gains related to lower costs due to economies of scale or improved operating efficiency-reduced E(C t )-usually reflected in improved cost-to-income ratios as well as better tax efficiency; or (3) reductions in risk associated with improved risk management or diversification of the firm across business streams, client segments, or geographies whose revenue contributions are imperfectly correlated and therefore reduce the composite a t .
This relationship can be depicted in a different way, as in figure 3 . The left-hand bar represents the baseline market value of equity (BMVE). This starts with the book value of equity (BVE)-the sum of (1) the par value of shares when originally issued; (2) the surplus paid in by investors when the shares were issued; (3) retained earnings on the books of the bank; and (4) reserves set aside for loan losses.
41 BVE must be written up or written down by unrealized capital gains or losses associated with the mark-to-market values of all balance sheet items. This cal-41. Saunders (2000) . culation yields the adjusted book value of equity (ABVE). Its value may depart significantly from BVE for banks and insurance companies due to a general absence of market value accounting across major categories of balance sheet items, although it may come pretty close for securities firms and asset managers.
After all balance sheet values have been taken into account and marked to market, there may still be a material difference between ABVE and the actual BMVE. This difference represents the market's assessment of the present value of the risk-adjusted future net earnings stream, capturing all known or suspected business opportunities, costs, and risks facing the firm and captured in the above equation-the "franchise value" of the firm. This value then increases or decreases in accordance with the size and scope effects discussed previously to ascertain the potential market value of equity (PMVE) in figure 3 .
A simpler version is "Tobin's Q," defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm's equity divided by a firm's book value. If the Q ratio is significantly below 1, for example, breaking up the firm may serve the interests of shareholders if the book value of equity can be monetized. The Q ratio for well-run financial firms having a positive franchise value should normally be well in excess of 1 and is clearly susceptible to enhancement through managerial action.
In figure 3 , each of the factors related to the size and breadth of financial services firms is identified in successive bars-scale and scope effects, operating and tax efficiencies, stability and TBTF premiums, conglomerate discount, and the rest-in building to the value of equity observed in the market, MVE. The difference between book value or market-adjusted book value could be highly positive, as it has been in the case of AIG in the insurance sector, for example. Or it could be significantly negative, with the firm's stock trading well below book value or even notional market-adjusted book value (its presumptive liquidation value). For example, J. P. Morgan Chase stock was trading below book value in late September 2002, reflecting concerns of large exposures (especially in the telecommunications sector) and questions about the bank's strategy and its execution.
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When strategic initiatives are undertaken, such as mergers or acquisitions, it is possible to add some empirical content to this kind of con-struct. During a period of intense M&A activity in the 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. commercial bank acquisitions occurred at price to book value ratios of about 2.0, sometimes as high as 3.0 or even more. In eight of the eleven years covered by one study, the mean price to book value ratio for U.S. commercial banking acquisitions was below 2.0, averaging 1.5 and ranging from 1.1 in 1990 to 1.8 in 1985. 43 In two years, the price to book value ratio exceeded 2.0-in 1986 it was 2.8, and in 1993 it was 3.2. These values presumably reflect the opportunity for the acquired institutions to be managed differently and to realize the incremental value needed to reimburse the shareholders of the acquiring institutions for their willingness to pay the premium in the first place. If in fact the potential to capture value for multifunctional financial firms exceeds that for the traditional U.S.-type separated commercial banks reflected in such studies, this should be reflected in higher merger premiums outside the United States as well as within the United States after the 1999 liberalization of line-of-business restrictions. Table 2 shows a decidedly mixed track record of a number of mergers during the 1998-2001 period.
Event study methodology can also be used to determine investor reaction to events such as the announcement of a presumably value-enhancing merger that adds either size or scope. 44 The technique controls for conditions in the general market and tries to determine the relationship that a particular stock has with the market under "normal" conditionsthat is, before the event occurs. This relationship can be established by regressing the returns of the stock on the market index and a constant. 45 One then determines what the stock "should" have earned (total return) given the state of the general market as well as the stock's past relationship with that market. These hypothetical returns are compared with actual returns to determine the abnormal returns-that is, how much more or less the stock actually earns as a result of the announcement.
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Abnormal returns are added together over various time periods, usually several days before the announcement to several days after. One needs to look at a few days before the event in case any news about the
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43. Walter and Smith (2000) . 44. Brown and Warner (1985) . 45. We obtain the following relationship: a i + b i R Mt where R Mt = the return on the market at time t; a i = regression result on the constant; b i = relationship between the market and stock i, also known as the beta of stock i.
46. That is, AR it = R it -(a i + b i R Mt ), where AR it = abnormal return for stock i at time t; R it = return on stock i at time t; and R Mt = the return on the market at time t. b. Difference between offer price and market price one week before offer. c. Percentage point differences over specified periods relative to Standard and Poor's 500 peers. d. Price change one week pre-and post-announcement. e. Price change one week pre-announcement to one year post-announcement.
event has leaked and affected the value of the stock. Looking at the abnormal returns for a few days after the announcement allows one to take "second thoughts" into account. The market may be so surprised by an announcement that it may need a few days to digest the news. One cannot know for sure the ideal length of the pre-or post-event periods. Extending either period leads to problems, since other events such as earnings reports or changes in management could have occurred and the market could be reacting to them instead of the one being examined.
As an example of how the event study approach can be used, we apply it to the seven strategic M&A deals undertaken by UBS AG and its predecessor organizations during the period 1992-2000. These include the Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) acquisition of O'Connor (January 9, 1992), the SBC acquisition of Brinson (August 31, 1994) , the SBC acquisition of S.G. Warburg (May 2, 1995) , the SBC takeover of Dillon Read (May 15, 1997), the merger of Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) to form the present UBS AG (December 8, 1997), the UBS acquisition of Global Asset Management (GAM) announced in September 13, 1999, and the UBS acquisition of PaineWebber announced on July 11, 2000. The first four deals were undertaken by Swiss Bank Corporation and can therefore be viewed in terms of the impact on the share price of SBC, the SBC-UBS merger in 1997 can be examined in terms of both SBC and UBS cumulative abnormal returns, while the GAM and PaineWebber deals can be viewed in terms of the impact on shares of the new UBS AG.
We estimate alpha and beta using daily returns from 500 to ten days before the merger announcement by regressing the returns of the stock on the returns of the Swiss SMI index. To determine the extent to which a particular merger was perceived by the market to have created or destroyed value, we cumulate the abnormal returns for various event windows for each SBC and UBS transaction beginning with O'Connor in 1992 and ending with PaineWebber in 2000. As mentioned, no scientific way of determining the ideal event window exists. No confounding events (earnings reports, changes in management, other major mergers) occurred around the time of the merger announcements. We therefore conclude that the market was reacting only to the announcement of the particular merger. The respective calculated abnormal returns are shown in table 3.
No regularity is obvious from the market's reactions to the SBC or UBS merger or acquisition announcements based on the seven cases examined here. That is, the market appears to judge each merger on its own merits. Market reaction to the merger of UBS and SBC, for example, was highly positive for shareholders of both firms, possibly reflecting cost cuts (especially in the domestic banking business) that could be made possible by the merger together with the presumably stronger competitive position of the new UBS AG in its various lines of activity, notably private banking and investment banking. This is in line with earlier event study research, such as that of DeLong and that of Houston, James, and Ryngaert, which finds that in-market (focusing) mergers tend to create value on announcement based on the flow of U.S. financial services deals-targets of in-market mergers gain and acquirers do not lose. 47 In contrast, market reaction to the UBS acquisition of PaineWebber was strongly negative, probably in large part due to the dilutive effect of the high price paid.
To obtain an alternative, rough assessment of whether bigger is better in commercial banking from the standpoint of firm valuation, we conduct a nonparametric Spearman rank correlation analysis between asset footings, as a measure of size, and market valuation as reflected in priceearnings ratios for each year during 1992-2001-a Spearman coefficient of +1 indicates a perfect correlation between size and valuation, -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation, and 0 indicates no correlation. We hypothesize that there is no correlation. Indeed, the Spearman coefficient is 0.1249, which is not significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 47. DeLong (2001) ; Houston, James, and Ryngaert (1999) . percent levels of significance (two-tailed) in any year. In the case of insurance, however (measuring size by premium flow), the same is true at the 0.01 level of significance, although the Spearman coefficient of 0.3791 is significant at the 0.05 level of significance in four of the ten years. The same test for broker-dealers and asset managers is not meaningful because the number of independent firms with listed equities is insufficient.
Conclusions
Assessing the potential effects of size and scope in financial services firms is as straightforward in concept as it is difficult to calibrate in practice. The positives include economies of scale, improvements in operating efficiency (including the impact of technology), cost economies of scope, revenue economies of scope, impact on market structure and pricing power, improved financial stability through diversification of revenue streams, improvements in the attraction and retention of human capital, and possibly TBTF support. The negatives include diseconomies of scale, higher operating costs due to increased size and complexity, diseconomies of scope on either the cost or revenue sides (or both), the impact of possible conflicts of interest on the franchise value of the firm, and a possible conglomerate discount in the share price. Bigger and broader is sometimes better, sometimes not. It all depends.
The evidence so far suggests rather limited prospects for firmwide cost economies of scale and scope among major financial services firms in terms of overall cost structures, although they certainly exist in specific lines of activity. Operating economies (X-efficiency) seem to be the principal determinant of observed differences in cost levels among banks and nonbank financial institutions. Revenue economies of scope through cross-selling may well exist, but they are likely to apply very differently to specific client segments and product lines. Conflicts of interest can pose major risks for shareholders of multifunctional financial firms, which may materialize in civil or even criminal litigation and losses in franchise value. There is plenty of evidence that diversification across uncorrelated business streams promotes stability, although unexpected spikes in correlation (as between insurance and investment banking) may arise from time to time. Table 4 shows the most valuable financial services in the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world by their market capitalization. Two observations can be made. First, the largest firms, by whatever measures are used in the major industry segments, are not necessarily the most valuable. Indeed, rank correlations between size and market value are low. And second, both lists are highly diverse. Generalists and specialists co-habitate at the top of the financial services league in both regions of the world. Both observations suggest that the key is in "how" things are done rather than in "what" is done. Although the burden of proof tends to fall on bigger and broader firms, a few cases like GE Capital Services (a conglomerate within a conglomerate) show that specialist businesses run by specialists on a highly rated capital platform-subject to unrelenting pressure to sweat the equity by a demanding corporate owner insisting on market dominance together with benchmark attention to service quality, cost control, and risk control-can be done and that it can be done on a sustained basis. However, even here the issue of transparency eventually forced a breakup of GE Capital's organizational structure in 2002.
In a way, the absence of clear signs of "strategic dominance"-generalists gaining the upper hand over specialists or the other way round-is encouraging. Any number can play, and there are no magic formulas. The devil remains in the details, and there is a premium on plain old good management. From a systemic perspective as well, diversity in the financial system is probably a good thing, as firms competing across strategic groups as well as within them put a premium on both efficiency in financial allocation and innovation in the evolution of financial products and processes. a. Earnings volatility-adjusted GE Capital Services contribution to General Electric multiplied by General Electric market capitalization.
